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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Petitioner, Mr. Zupon, filed this petition for review of 
the Commission's August 3, 1992, Order affirming the Administrative 
Law Judge's February 6, 1992, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, both of which orders denied Mr. Zupon's application for 
permanent total disability benefits. Respondents Kaiser Steel 
Corporation ("Kaiser"), Uninsured Employer's Fund ("UEF"), 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") and Industrial Commission of 
Utah ("Commission") (collectively referred to herein as 
"Respondents") agree with the statutory bases for jurisdiction 
cited in Mr. Zupon's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Respondents agree that this appeal presents the issue of 
whether the Commission applied the proper standard of proof. The 
second two issues listed by Petitioner, whether the Commission 
ignored a prior finding and improperly failed to award permanent 
total disability compensation, are really just a request that the 
Court of Appeals re-weigh the evidence considered by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
Accordingly, the standard of appellate review to be applied to 
the first issue is that of correction of error. Utah Code Ann. 
S63-46b-16(4)(d); King v. Industrial Commission 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 
33, 34 (Utah App. March 18, 1993). The remaining issues call into 
question the Commission's factual findings. Accordingly, the 
proper standard of appellate review for those issues is whether the 
Commission's findings are "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code 
Ann. S63-46b-16(4)(g); King v. Industrial Commission, 209 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 34. * 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
With the exception of the provisions of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act cited above, Respondents agree that 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 is the determinative statute in this case. 
Mr. Zupon also raises in the body of his brief the limitations 
provision in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66. A copy of that Section as it 
existed at the time of the accident is attached to this Brief as 
Exhibit "A." In 1975, there was no statute of limitations 
applicable to permanent total disability claims. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-98(2) (1990 amendment setting limitations period for 
compensation claims). 
Although not raised as an issue in the Docketing 
Statement (Record, p. 59) or in the Statement of Issues in the 
Brief (Brief, p. 1), Mr. Zupon also questions the adequacy of the 
Commission's detailed Findings of Fact (Brief 11). The adequacy of 
the findings themselves is a legal determination for this Court, 
Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991). The 
Respondents will demonstrate the adequacy of those findings. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a denial of Mr. Zupon's May 24, 1991, 
application for compensation for permanent total disability 
allegedly caused by an industrial injury which occurred on August 
7, 1975. 
Course of Proceedings 
Shortly following Mr. Zupon's August 7, 1975 accident he filed 
an application for hearing alleging entitlement to temporary total 
and permanent partial disability compensation. On February 10, 
1977, an Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order finding Mr. Zupon entitled to 25 and 
4/7 weeks of temporary total compensation benefits and 31.2 weeks 
of permanent partial disability compensation benefits (Record, pp. 
90-92). 
Nearly 16 years later, on May 24, 1991, Mr. Zupon filed an 
application for permanent total disability benefits as a result of 
his 1975 accident (Record, p. 1). Kaiser and the UEF answered the 
application for hearing and moved to join the ERF as a respondent 
(Record, pp. 3-5). After all parties had executed a stipulation 
apportioning liability for any potential benefits between 
Defendants (Record, pp. 18-20), a formal hearing was held on 
February 6, 1992 (Record, p. 21). 
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Agency Disposition 
On March 18, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge entered her 
detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order concluding 
that Mr. Zupon failed to sustain his burden of establishing that 
his accident was the medical cause of his disability. The ALJ 
therefore denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits 
(Record, pp. 21-30, copy attached as Exhibit "B" to Mr. Zupon's 
brief). 
Mr. Zupon filed a Motion for Review with the Commission 
assigning five points of error (Record, pp. 32-34). When no 
supporting memorandum was filed, the ALJ clarified her ruling and 
responded to each point (Record, pp. 38-39). Mr. Zupon belatedly 
filed a "Reply Memorandum in Response to Administrative Law Judge's 
Comments In Re Motion for Review" (Record, pp. 40-45). The 
Commission then entered its August 3, 1992, Order Denying Motion 
for Review separately addressing each of Mr. Zupon's points 
(Record, pp. 46-50, copy attached as Exhibit "C" to Mr. Zupon's 
brief). The Commission's action is the subject of Mr. Zupon's 
Petition for Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Zupon strained his back in an industrial accident at 
Kaiser on August 7, 1975 (Record, pp. 22, 83). No party has 
contested either the event of the accident or how it occurred. He 
was promptly, but conservatively, treated by Dr. Smoot at Carbon 
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Medical Services Association (Record, pp. 23, 100-110). Mr. Zupon 
was subsequently seen by Dr. Chapman who first suggested a 50% loss 
of body function due to the accident; Dr. Chapman later retrenched 
and acknowledged he should not assign a disability rating, and he 
ultimately concluded "It is my opinion that this man is permanently 
disabled for his regular occupation in the coal mine by nature of 
his progressive generalized arthritis" (Record, p. 226). 
A hearing on Mr. Zupon's claim for permanent partial 
disability benefits was held on August 23, 1976, and his case was 
referred to a medical panel. That panel issued its report on 
November 24, 1976, finding that Mr. Zupon's "total physical 
impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the 
industrial injury, but excluding the eye, is 60%" (Record, p. 89). 
The panel attributed a 10% permanent physical impairment to the 
industrial injury "on the basis that there is a one-in-six chance 
that the ankylosingspondylitis was aggravated by the lumbar back 
strain" (Record, p. 89). The panel also found that no future 
medical treatment for the industrial injury would be necessary. 
Notwithstanding the patently speculative nature of the panel's 
finding, but in the absence of any objection by the parties, the 
ALJ entered his order adopting the medical panel's findings 
(Record, pp. 90-92). The compensation ordered by the ALJ was paid 
by Kaiser (Record, p. 19). 
2
 Mr. Zupon had lost the sight of his left eye twenty years 
before (Record, p. 88). 
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Nearly contemporaneously with the medical panel's 
deliberations, Mr. Zupon saw Dr. McArthur whose impressions were 
"Residuals of a back strain. I do not believe this man has 
sufficient enough back pain to keep him from working" (Record, 
p. 225). 
While Mr. Zupon's application for permanent partial disability 
compensation was pending with the Commission, he initiated a claim 
for Social Security disability benefits. His initial claim was 
filed October 7, 1975 (Record, pp. 23, 239). That application was 
denied, the claim was denied again on reconsideration, and the 
denial was affirmed by the appeals counsel on January 18, 1977. 
(Record, p. 240). A supplemental hearing was conducted on May 31, 
1978, resulting in a detailed decision based upon medical reports 
and a vocational expert (Record, pp. 240-244). Noting that Mr. 
Zupon had suffered a "back strain" as a result of his 1975 
industrial accident, the Social Security ALJ found that level of 
impairment did not preclude him from working. After summarizing 
the uncontroverted evidence of a progressive arthritic condition, 
the ALJ stated: 
The administrative law judge is impressed with the 
sincerity of the claimant when he testified that 
beginning in January 1977 he lost the dexterity in his 
hands. Until that time the claimant is not deemed to 
have been disabled but considering the credibility of the 
claimant's testimony as to the effect of arthritis in his 
hands and fingers together with his other impairments, it 
is found that the claimant became disabled January 1, 
1977, which disability has been continuing. 
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(Record, p. 244) Social Security benefits were then awarded.3 
There are no medical records indicating any progression or 
deterioration of Mr. Zupon's condition. Indeed, there is no 
evidence of any back treatment after 1977. The only medical record 
relating to Mr. Zupon*s back from the period between the 1978 
Social Security Administration hearing and the present is a 
December 9, 1981 medical evaluation by Clyde Bench, M.D. Dr. Bench 
concluded his final December 8, 1981, report with a series of 
findings relating to degenerative arthritis and concluded "I think 
this patient's symptoms are way out of proportion to the objective 
findings which are presented" (Record, pp. 26, 249). Dr. Bench 
offered no opinion that Mr. Zupon1s remaining conditions were due 
to the industrial accident. 
In 1991, Mr. Zupon filed his new claim for permanent total 
disability benefits alleging that, at age 67, he was now unable to 
work as a result of his August 7, 1975, industrial injury. His 
claim was denied by the ALJ (Record, pp. 21-30), and that denial 
was affirmed by the Commission (Record, pp. 46-50). Between his 
accident and the time of hearing, he had been awarded temporary 
total and permanent partial disability benefits from the Industrial 
Commission, Union Disability benefits, Social Security benefits, 
Notably, Dr. M.B. Jensen who examined Mr. Zupon on March 
24, 1977, apparently in connection with his Social Security claim, 
did not even mention an industrial accident in his medical 
evaluation (Record, pp. 96-97). None of his diagnoses implicated 
any industrial cause. 
-7-
non-service connected VA disability benefits and federal Black Lung 
total disability benefits (Record, pp. 4, 27). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission properly found that Mr. Zupon failed to carry 
his affirmative burden of proof of establishing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that his industrial injury was the medical cause of 
his disability. Contrary to his argument, the "liberal policy" 
behind the Worker's Compensation laws is not a substitute for this 
burden of proof. 
There is no affirmative medical evidence that the 1975 
accident rendered the applicant permanent totally disabled. He 
never underwent surgery for his back and obtained no impairment 
rating beyond what was already paid by Kaiser. The record contains 
no medical evidence indicating any new development since the 
Commission's earlier award, with the exceptions of the Social 
Security Administration records (which document a disability caused 
instead by a loss of dexterity in his hands) and Dr. Bench's 
assessment that his symptoms are out of proportion with the 
objective findings. 
The ALJ carefully and comprehensively analyzed this largely 
uncontradicted evidence. Her denial of benefits, and the 
Commission's order affirming that denial, are amply supported by 
substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION APPLIED THE CORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF, 
The ALJ found, on two alternative bases, that Mr. Zupon failed 
to sustain his burden of establishing medical causation (Record, 
pp. 27-29). In denying Mr. Zupon's motion for review, the 
Commission found that ALJ had properly required proof of causation 
by preponderance of the evidence (Record, p. 46). The findings of 
both the ALJ and the Commission are appropriate and should be 
affirmed. 
The Utah courts have consistently required proof of a causal 
connection between the injury and the employment. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986). In Allen, the 
Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for causation. In order to 
identify compensable injuries, consideration must first be given to 
the legal cause of the injury and then to its medical cause, which 
is to prove that "the disability is medically the result of an 
exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." 
Id. at 27. Proof of medical causation is required, according to 
the court, to prevent the employer from becoming "a general insurer 
of his employees." Thus, it remains the claimant's burden to show 
that "the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. In the event 
the claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation 
should be denied." Id. at 27. 
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The Allen holding was followed by this Court in the case of 
Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 
1988). In Large, a truck driver suffered a lower back injury while 
applying for a job. Much like the present case, he received an 
initial award of temporary total disability benefits which was not 
appealed. Some time later, he filed an application alleging 
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits because 5% of 
his impairment was due to the 1985 accident. This Court rehearsed 
the legal/medical causes tests under Allen and noted that the 
standard of proof for causation is that of a preponderance of the 
evidence. Jd. at 956. In light of the applicant's history of 
prior back problems, including surgeries, the court found 
substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the 
1985 injury with its 5% additional impairment was not the medical 
cause of permanent total disability. Ld. at 957. These standards 
were expressly followed by both the ALJ and the Commission in the 
present case. 
Mr. Zupon makes two arguments to suggest that the Commission 
should have applied a different burden of proof. He first argues 
that the "liberal construction" required of the Worker's 
Compensation Act is somehow a substitute for his burden of proof. 
Then, he argues that the burden of proof is not his, but rather 
that it rests with the employer to find a line of employment that 
the employee can do. Both arguments fail. 
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Mr. Zupon argues that all doubts, no matter how remote, must 
be resolved in favor of an award of compensation and that it is 
error if the judge's "liberal construction" is not obvious from the 
face of the order (Brief pp. 5-7). While the well-recognized 
beneficial policies of the Worker's Compensation Act are 
acknowledged by the Respondents, the argument that even the 
slightest question of fact requires an award of benefits greatly 
distorts the policies of the law. His argument, if adopted, would 
effectively result in a presumption of entitlement to benefits. 
Employers would then have the burden in each case of rebutting the 
presumption. Such a presumption has never been a part of Utah 
Workers' Compensation law. 
As noted above, the Utah courts have held that the burden 
remains with the applicant to establish his entitlement to benefits 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Benefits are to be awarded 
based upon evidence, not speculation. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985), a case cited by 
Mr. Zupon, Chief Justice Hall observed: 
"The acknowledged purpose of the Worker's Compensation 
Act is to compensate for the incapacities attributable to 
industrial injuries. However, it is not the purpose of 
the Act to provide a general health insurance plan 
covering and providing for compensation for any and all 
preexisting incapacities an employee may suffer from, and 
this Court has never so indicated." 
709 P.2d at 1172 (Hall, J., dissenting, emphasis by the Court, 
citation omitted). 
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Mr. Zupon's theory that this policy requires an award of 
benefits regardless of how the evidence preponderates would 
effectively remove the element of proof and make of the Worker's 
Compensation program a general health insurance plan. Even the 
most "liberal" construction of the law cannot require this result. 
Rather, those cases cited by Mr. Zupon must be read to apply to 
substantial doubts raised by equally probative but contradictory 
evidence. Even in such cases, care must be taken not to ignore the 
requirements that the evidence preponderate in the applicant's 
favor before an award of benefits is made. 
Caution must also be exercised in applying a "liberal 
construction" to make sure that the rights of all parties are 
safeguarded, not just those of the injured worker. The United 
States Supreme Court, in a case involving the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA"), has discussed the 
balance struck in Workers' Compensation legislation: 
Implicit in [respondents'] argument, however, is the 
assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to 
provide disabled workers with a complete remedy for their 
industrial injuries. The inaccuracy of this implicit 
assumption undercuts the validity of respondents' 
argument. 
The LHWCA, like other workmen's compensation 
legislation, is indeed remedial in that it was intended 
to provide a certain recovery for employees who are 
injured on the job. It imposes liability without fault 
and precludes the assertion of various common-law 
defenses that had frequently resulted in the denial of 
any recovery for disabled laborers. While providing 
employees with the benefit of a more certain recovery for 
work-related harms, statutes of this kind to not purport 
to provide complete compensation for the wage earner's 
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economic loss. . . . [L]ike most workmen's compensation 
legislation, the LHWCA represents a compromise between 
the competing interests of disabled laborers and their 
employers. 
Potomac Electric Power Company v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 
282-283 (1980). The Utah Workers' Compensation Act also reflects 
such a compromise. 
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge did afford Mr. 
Zupon the "extreme benefit of the doubt" in the present case 
(Record, p. 29). Expressing her skepticism about the speculative 
"one-in-six chance" basis for the 10% whole person impairment 
previously adopted to support Mr. Zupon's permanent partial 
disability award, she analyzed the evidence on that basis and still 
found the required proof of causation lacking. 
Similarly, the applicant's reliance on Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) is misplaced. In the first 
place, that case ("Marshall II") treats the subject of an 
applicant's entitlement to interest on an award of benefits. Mr. 
Zupon apparently meant to cite Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 
681 P.2d 208 (1984), ("Marshall I"), in which the Supreme Court 
formally adopted the "odd lot doctrine." Under Marshall I, the 
burden shifts to the employer in such cases to show that regular 
work is available, but only after the employee has demonstrated 
that his work-related impairment prevents him from performing his 
former work and that he cannot be rehabilitated. Id. at 212-213; 
Ortiz v. Industrial Commission, 766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (UtahApp. 1989). 
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Marshall I does not excuse an applicant's failure to prove 
that his disability is work-related, and it implicitly contemplates 
that an application for hearing will be filed in a timely fashion 
so that the questions of rehabilitation and available work can be 
addressed while the evidence is fresh and the applicant is 
motivated and of employment age. In the present case, as 
demonstrated below, Mr. Zupon did not demonstrate that his 
disability was caused by his industrial accident. Moreover, his 
16-year delay in claiming permanent total disability benefits would 
work to the extreme prejudice of Respondents, should the odd lot 
doctrine be applied.4 At least where the delay is responsibility 
of the applicant for benefits, and was not contributed to in any 
meaningful way by the Respondents, any shifting of the burden of 
proof would be grossly prejudicial and unfair to Respondents. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF BENEFITS AS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The ALJ exhaustively reviewed the evidence in this claim and 
found that Mr. Zupon had not met his burden of proof. Accordingly, 
permanent total disability benefits were denied. The ALJ later 
clarified her findings in a separate letter filed in response to 
4
 Indeed, in this case, the applicant has conceded that the 
employer (the party to whom the burden shifts under the odd lot 
analysis) satisfied all its obligations to the applicant (Record, 
pp. 18, 19). Mr. Zupon's burden-shifting argument becomes even 
more inapposite when the impact of his suggested burden falls 
sixteen years later on the various state funds that are called upon 
to supplement and/or continue payments of benefits. 
-14-
Mr. Zupon's unsupported Motion for Review (Record, pp. 38, 39). 
After the Motion was supplemented with a "Reply Memorandum" the 
full Commission considered the Motion for Review and entered its 
Order Denying Motion for Review (Record, pp. 46-50). 
Mr. Zupon, in the second and third issues presented on appeal 
(Brief, p. 1) essentially asks the Court of Appeals to reweigh the 
evidence and decide the case differently. In Merriam v. Board of 
Review, 812 P.2d 447 (Utah App. 1991), this Court restated its rule 
that, under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, findings of 
fact will be affirmed if they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Reaffirming that it remains the appellant's burden to 
martial the evidence to show that the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence, and citing Allen for the proposition that a 
claimant must prove the alleged disability was medically caused by 
work-related activity, the Court acknowledged that "if a claimant 
cannot demonstrate a medical causal connection, compensation should 
be denied. Medical causation is a factual matter." Id. at 450 
(citations omitted). 
This standard of review is consistent with this Court's recent 
comprehensive discussion of standard of review applicable to 
Industrial Commission appeals in King v. Industrial Commission, 209 
Utah Adv. Rep. 33 App. (Utah March 18, 1993) (factual findings are 
reviewed under substantial evidence standard; interpretations of 
law reviewed under a correction of error standard). The factual 
findings entered by the Administrative Law Judge and by the 
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Commission in this case all enjoy the support of substantial 
evidence. 
Mr. Zupon attempts once again to twist the burden of proof by 
arguing in the double negative: "There was no evidence presented 
which indicated in any way the Mr. Zupon's inability to work was 
related to his asymptomatic degenerative arthritis. . ." (Brief, 
p. 10). Even though there was ample evidence of that fact, he 
ignores the conclusion his argument dictates: the lack of evidence 
means he failed to meet his burden of proof. 
Mr. Zupon then criticizes the Findings of Fact entered by the 
ALJ as "grossly inadequate," citing Adams v. Board of Review, 821 
P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991). Her findings are not susceptible to that 
criticism. The ALJ discussed the evidence at length in her 10 page 
opinion (Record, pp. 21-30). She made findings as to how the 
accident occurred and traced in meticulous detail the course of Mr. 
Zuponfs medical treatment. Her task was made easier by the fact 
that there was little or no contradiction in the medical evidence. 
Importantly, all of the medical evidence in the record was offered 
by Mr. Zupon in Exhibits "A" to "M" (Record, pp. 83-258). The 
Respondents offered no medical documents. Thus, Mr. Zupon1s burden 
on appeal is to martial his own medical evidence to show that the 
findings are inadequate, as he provided no transcript against which 
to evaluate his contentions. King v. Industrial Commission, 209 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 34. He has not met this burden. 
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Although the ALJ did not make her findings in separately 
numbered paragraphs
 # nevertheless, they explicitly reveal the steps 
she took in reaching her decision. Adams v. Board of Review# 821 
P.2d at 5. Having described the accident (Record, p. 22) the ALJ 
noted Mr. Zupon's complaints of pain "all over" and that he applied 
for Social Security disability benefits after asking Dr. Smoot 
about being "totalled out" (Record, p. 23). She traced Mr. Zupon's 
treatment by Dr. Chapman who initially suggested the 50% loss of 
body function, but then declined to issue a disability rating. In 
particular, she acknowledged Dr. Chapman's conclusion that "the 
applicant was permanently disabled for his regular occupation in 
the coal mine due to progressive generalized arthritis" (Record, 
pp. 23-24, emphasis added). She then discussed the medical panel 
findings and Dr. McArthur's concurrent finding that the applicant 
did not have sufficient pain from his acute lumbar strain to keep 
him from working. She juxtaposed that finding with the medical 
panel's 10% impairment rating based on a "one-in-six chance that 
his preexisting problems were aggravated by the lumbar back strain" 
(Record, p. 25). Finally, she made findings relating to the denial 
of Social Security benefits and a later award of those benefits 
based upon the progression of arthritis in the applicant's hands 
and fingers (Record, pp. 25-26). 
Based upon these findings, the ALJ made alternative 
conclusions about Mr. Zupon's failure to establish medical 
causation, either of which will support the denial of benefits. 
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First, she found that the cause of his inability to work was the 
arthritic condition in his hands and fingers based upon the "very 
relevant and convincing" findings of the Social Security 
Administration entered into evidence by Mr. Zupon. She did not 
rely solely upon those findings, however, because she correlated 
them with the other medical records (Record, pp. 27-28). Second, 
although she had "real questions" about the prior ALJ's adoption of 
the medical panel's 10% impairment based upon a one-in-six chance 
of aggravation, she expressed her willingness to give the applicant 
the "extreme" benefit of the doubt in that regard and still found 
his proof lacking. In light of the consistent other medical 
evidence and the apparent lack of any new development with his back 
after 1976, she found the claimant failed to carry his burden of 
establishing that the industrial injury caused his total disability 
(Record, pp. 28-29).5 
These findings were noted and highlighted by the Commission in 
its Order Denying Motion for Review (Record, pp. 46-51). The 
Commission briefly discussed the pertinent medical evidence and, 
like the ALJ, found that Mr. Zupon failed to carry his burden of 
establishing medical causation. Accordingly, benefits were denied. 
5
 Mr. Zupon criticizes the ALJ for ignoring the prior 10% 
impairment award (Brief, pp. 10-11). In fact, she addressed that 
award several times and made an alternative finding based upon it. 
Notwithstanding the Commission's continuing jurisdiction to modify 
such an award under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78, she did not alter the 
prior order. Nor did Mr. Zupon demonstrate any significant change 
or new development since the earlier order that would justify a 
modification in his favor. 
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The Commission's findings, though more brief than those of the ALJ, 
are clear, consistent, and are supported by substantial evidence. 
This case is very similar to Hodges v. Western Piling & 
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). In that case, the 
petitioner had an accident which resulted in a flair-up of his 
arthritic condition. A medical panel found the petitioner had a 
significant impairment due to arthritis and other causes and a 9% 
to 12% permanent loss of body function due to the industrial 
injury. The Supreme Court noted that there was substantial 
evidence to support the Commission's determination that the injury 
did not result in permanent and total disability. The case was 
then remanded solely to resolve some mathematical inconsistencies 
in the medical panel's findings. 
In the present case, Mr. Zupon sustained an industrial 
accident. His injury was rated and paid. He accepted that payment 
without appeal. Some sixteen years later, with absolutely no 
medical evidence of any change or deterioration in that condition, 
he now asks for an award of permanent total disability 
compensation. The Commission properly found that Mr. Zupon did not 
prove that his disability was medically caused by his accident and 
therefore denied his claim. That finding should be affirmed. 
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III. MR, ZUPON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF PERMANENT 
PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION. 
In his memorandum supporting the motion for review with the 
Industrial Commission, the applicant for the first time asked for 
an award of additional permanent partial disability compensation 
(Record, pp. 43-44). That request was denied by the Commission 
because the applicant had never requested consideration of such a 
claim and it was therefore barred by the then-applicable eight year 
statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. S35-1-66 (Exhibit "A" to 
this brief). 
On appeal, Mr. Zupon again raises this question though he 
attempts to cloak it under the title of permanent total disability 
compensation (Brief pp. 13-14). His argument is that he was never 
compensated for the preexisting component of his industrial 
accident and that the Commission could not bar his request on the 
basis of the statute of limitations because that was "an 
affirmative defense and was never raised by the employer or the 
uninsured employer's fund at the hearing level" (Brief at 14). Mr. 
Zupon's argument fails on several obvious bases. 
No affirmative defense was raised by Kaiser or the UEF at 
hearing because those parties had been excused pursuant to Mr. 
Zupon's stipulation and in accordance with a letter from his 
attorney (Record, pp. 17-20). Moreover, no party could have raised 
the statute of limitations applicable to claims for permanent 
partial disability benefits because Mr. Zupon did not raise that 
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claim as an issue at hearing (Record, p. 1). It was first raised 
in his Reply Memorandum to the Commission, and was promptly 
rejected by the Commission. 
Finally, it is clear that the applicable statute of 
limitations did run. After his accident, Mr. Zupon had eight years 
within which to file a claim for permanent partial disability 
compensation. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 
782 (Utah 1984). He did so and received a 10% award. No 
additional application was filed within the eight-year period and 
no grounds for modification have been demonstrated. 
The Commission properly declined to amend additional permanent 
partial disability compensation.6 
CONCLUSION 
The orders of the ALJ and the Commission applied proper legal 
standards and their findings are amply supported by the medical 
evidence in the record. That evidence demonstrates Mr. Zupon 
sustained an industrial accident in 1975 for which he was fully 
compensated. No medical evidence documents that the industrial 
accident is the cause of total disability. Instead, Mr. Zupon's 
evidence demonstrates that his disability is due to other causes. 
Even if the current statute of limitations were deemed 
applicable because of the date of the application for hearing, the 
claim would be barred because it was not filed within six years 
from the date of the accident. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98. 
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The Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 1993. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW, P.C. 
, f e « » — , •> 
Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Kaiser Steel Corporation 
and the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
Sims, Esq. 
or the Industrial 
'ssion of Utah 
Attorney for the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund 
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I hereby certify that on April 15, 1993, four copies of the 
foregoing JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS were mailed U.S. first class 
mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C. 
350 South 400 East, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Tab A 
causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such 
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight 
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66%% of the 
difference between his average weekly wages before the accident and the 
weekly wages he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than a maximum 
of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and in addition thereto $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for each 
dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of 
four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66%% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at any 
time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee whose 
physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application for 
such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, 
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of 
compensation. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, 
or the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 
18 years; up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not 
to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated against 
such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation 
hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of "Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow 
joint, or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps 
tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpo-
metacarpal bone ™ 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of meta-
carpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of meta-
carpal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of meta-
carpal bone 17 
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(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of meta-
carpal bone . 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity 
of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or 
Gritti-Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump 
(three inches or less below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd—5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to 
loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage 
of the complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, how-
ever, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid 
as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in 
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps) us-
ing pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) approved 
by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of hearing 
impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 2000 cycles 
per second shall not be considered in determining compensable disability. 
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced 
age and is considered to be due to general environment rather than in-
dustrial conditions. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical 
professions appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear 
at the three frequencies 500,1000 and 2000 cycles per second which shall be 
added together and divided by three to determine the average decibel loss. 
To allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel 
loss Y2 a decibel for each year of the employee's age over forty at the time 
of the accident: To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, 
(after deduction of the loss in decibels for presbycusis) the average decibel 
loss for each decibel of loss exceeding fifteen decibels shall be multiplied by 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of 
hearing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hear-
ing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial 
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits 
as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims 
for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist 
shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no 
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hear-
ing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise 
provided for herein, such period of compensation as the commission shall 
deem equitable and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for 
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in 
any case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation 
for permanent total loss of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations 
as to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and 
in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compen-
sation be required to be paid. 
